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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright, as it is constructed under international conventions
and copyright laws worldwide, has continuously expanded in duration,
scope, and subject matter.' The expansionist trend of copyright has
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Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and York University, Osgoode Hall
Law School, for their generous financial support, making this research work possible. I
thank Giuseppina D'Agostino, David Vaver, David Lametti, and Graeme Dinwoodie
for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this article, as well as Peter Yu,
and the participants of the 2014 Intellectual Property Roundtable (Drake Law School,
March 2014) for helpful comments.
1 Since its adoption in 1886, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
andArtistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] has
gone through many revisions to augment the protection of the exclusive rights of
copyright holders. Revisions were made in 1908 (in Berlin), in 1928 (Rome), in 1948
(Brussels), in 1967 (Stockholm), and in 1971 (Paris). Other amendments were made in
1979. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (amended on Sept. 28, 1979), online:
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/enlip/beme/trtdocs-woOOl.html. See also 1 SAM
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTS, THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ch. 3 (2d ed. 2006). Any subsequent
34
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intensified in recent years, in response to the disruptive threats posed
by the digital environment to its subsistence.2 Manifest in all corners,
including international organizations, legislative reform committees,
policy papers, copyright scholar commentaries, interest groups and civil
society movements, the heated debate persists on the merits and
justifications for such an expansion.3 More particularly, the effects of
international agreements adopted under the Berne Convention, such as the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WOO33EN, online:
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs wo033.html [hereinafter WCT] and
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WOO34EN, online:
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs-wo034.html [hereinafter WPPT], must
secure greater protection for copyright holders. See Berne Convention, art. 20. Parts II
and III of the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter TRIPS], create minimum standard obligations
for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, including copyright.
2 Id. The latest manifestations of the increased protection of intellectual property
(in particular copyright) at the international and national levels impact more
specifically online service providers and online users of copyright works by providing
additional enforcement powers to copyright holders in the digital environment. The
French law of 2009, Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection
de la cr6ation sur internet [ACT No. 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 Promoting the
Distribution and Protection of Creation on the Internet] [hereinafter HADOPI], the
UK Digital Economy Act of 2010, Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 (U.K.), and the
signature of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in 2011, Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc 147937.pdf [hereinafter
ACTA]., illustrate a new wave of regulation toward strengthening the means by which
copyright holders can enforce their exclusive rights and deter copyright infringement.
For a discussion on the procedural adoption and substantive issues around ACTA, see
Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and now open) Fears ofActa, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011). In
Canada, Bill C-8, an Act to amend the Copyright Act and the Trade-marks Act and to
make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2d Session, 41st Parl., 2013(Third
Reading, October 2, 2014), if adopted, will further amend Canada Copyright Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, by strengthening the civil and criminal remedies for copyright
infringement.
3 Attempts in the United States to introduce similar laws have met fierce resistance
from intermediaries and from members of the public, one culminating point being the
complete blackout of Wikipedia for one day in January 2012. Amy Goodman, The
SOPA blackout protest makes history, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2012, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-protest-
makes-history. In the United States, the Bill introduced in the House of
Representatives, the Stop Online Piracy Act [hereinafter SOPA], Stop Online Piracy
Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011), and the Bill introduced in the Senate, Preventing
Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act
[hereinafter PIPA], Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft
of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011), were subsequently
abandoned. See Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves
Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-
protest; Stephanie Condon, PIPA, SOPA put on hold in wake ofprotests, CBS NEWS,
Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pipa-sopa-put-on-hold-in-wake-of-
protests/. At the international level, the future of ACTA is uncertain. In July 2012, in
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copyright expansion on the desirable balance that needs to be struck
between the rights and interests of copyright holders, users,
intermediaries and the public are questioned and scrutinized.4
Whether copyright is property continues to ignite passionate
debate, more than 300 years after the entry into force of the Statute of
Anne.5 At the heart of the controversy lie various conceptions of
property, as well as the causal effect between characterizing copyright
as property and its rapid expansion. For some, the expansion of
copyright is attributable to the propertization of copyright.6 For others,
the root causes for the expansion of copyright must be sought
an unprecedented move, the European Parliament formally rejected the ratification of
ACTA by the EU. See Charles Arthur, Acta down, but not out, as Europe votes against
controversial treaty, THE GUARDIAN, July 4, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jul/04/acta-european-parliament-votes-
against. The eventual ratification of ACTA by the EU and its Member States had given
rise to broad opposition across Europe, the main fear being its limitations on Internet
freedom. Id. The proposed terms of and clout of secrecy under which the negotiations
for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Free Trade Agreement have been conducted
have also given rise to serious criticism. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Stiglitz to TPP
negotiators (December 6, 2013).
4 Discussions on the need to balance competing interests in copyright law have
been central in legislative reform, public policy, and scholarly debates. For example in
Canada, for a great part of the lengthy copyright legislative reform that has eventually
led to the entry into force of the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20; more
specifically, Bill C-32, an Act to amend the Copyright Act, B. C-32, 3d Sess., 4 0 th Parl.,
2010 (1s' reading June 2, 2010) and Bill C-11, an Act to amend the Copyright Act, B.
C-11, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2011 (which became the Copyright Modernization Act), the
Government of Canada labeled the initiative "Balanced Copyright," and the
Government website address where it communicated recent developments on
copyright law around the entry into force of the Copyright Modernization Act was
labelled "balancedcopyright.gc.ca." Amongst scholarly work, see, e.g., THOMAS
DREIER, BALANCING PROPRIETARY AND PUBLIC DOMAIN INTERESTS: INSIDE OR
OUTSIDE OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 295
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); FROM RADICAL EXTREMISM TO
BALANCED COPYRIGHT: CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA (Michael
Geist ed. 2010); OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL REPORTS ABOUT 'BALANCING COPYRIGHT'
(Reto Hilty et al. eds.,2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040607, reprinted in
BALANCING COPYRIGHT - A SURVEY OF NATIONAL APPROACHES (MPI STUDIES ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAw) 1-78 (Reto Hilty et al. eds., 2012).
The report surveys reports submitted by scholars with respect to 40 countries
worldwide (including Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France)
about how each jurisdiction approaches the concept of balancing competing interests
in copyright law.
5 See The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19 (1710) (An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
Copies, during the Times therein mentioned); see CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Helena Howe et al. eds., 2013) (focusing, in several
chapters, on the property attributes of copyright); see also discussion infra Part II and
Part III.
6 See discussion infra Part II.
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elsewhere, or the so-called expansionist effects of qualifying copyright
as property are attributable to a misconception of property.
The primary goal of this article is to look at the property attributes
of copyright to inform a more nuanced understanding of the nature of
copyright that emphasizes its distinct character. I resort primarily to
James W. Harris' theory in Property and Justice,8 and in particular, on
the insights that his characterization of property as the twin
manifestation of trespassory rules and of an ownership spectrum, bring
to the understanding of copyright. 9 While copyright holders' right to
exclude has been a focal point in copyright theory, 1 looking at
copyright through trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum allows
me to discern two distinct yet interrelated property interests that bring
a more refined understanding of the property attributes of copyright.
The first interest relates to copyright as a whole when considered
as the thingthat is the object of commercial exploitation, which satisfies
all requirements of a proprietary ownership interest. " The second
interest focuses on the nature of copyright holders' relationship to the
physical embodiment of their works (e.g. the commercial copies owned
by consumers or other users): it emerges as a limited, remote, non-
ownership proprietary interest. 12 Viewing copyright through the
combination of the bundle of rights as an object of commodification
and the more limited rights that copyright holders have with respect to
disseminated copies of their works puts greater emphasis on the
property attributes of copyright while underscoring their limited scope.
For instance, viewing copyright through two distinct proprietary
interests confirms that copyright holders cannot own their works once
they are commercialized. This illustrates how a property lens may in
fact narrow the scope of copyright, and challenge the perception that
associating copyright to property inevitably leads to its expansion.13 As
copyright holders' legal and technical powers of control increase, as
much as users' power of uses of copyright works multiply, the
temptations of drifting one way or the other on the debate regarding
the property attributes of copyright are high. I argue that
Id.
8 JAMES W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996).
9 Id. at 5. The ownership spectrum spans from "mere property" to "full-blooded
ownership." See discussion infra Part III.
10 See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: the Challenges
of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1365-78
(1989); HUGH BREAKEY, Properties of Copyright, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 137; discussion infra Part III.
" See discussion infra Part III.A.
12 See discussion infra Part III.B.
13 See discussion infra Part III. B.
2014] 37
38 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL [Vol. X
misinterpreting the consequences of the property attributes of
copyright may lead to unwarranted expansion, but that distancing
copyright from property for fear of expansionism is problematic from a
legal and normative standpoint. Acknowledging the property
attributes of copyright has the important additional benefit to reveal
more sharply the inherent tension that subsists between the competing
property rights of copyright holders and users in the embodiment of the
works. It levels the playing field by minimizing the tendency to apply
double standards to the competing rights.
In Part II, I discuss the ongoing debate on the nature of copyright
as a form of property, and how the controversy stems from divergent
conceptions of property. I challenge the notion that associating
copyright with property necessarily contributes to the expansion of
copyright. In Part III, I look at the attributes of copyright and how they
compare to other forms of tangible property through the application of
property law and theory. I conclude in Part IV by defining copyright as
a limited form of property that includes a property interest in the
embodiment of works (e.g. commercial copies of copyright works) and
by reflecting on the insights that this characterization brings to the
debate on the nature of copyright.
II. THE ONGOING DEBATE: IS COPYRIGHT PROPERTY?
Copyright has been described as a monopoly,14 as a regulatory
right or privilege, as a construction of statute,16 as an intellectual
14 R. J. Roberts, Canadian Copyright: Natural Property or Mere Monopoly, 40
CAN. PATENT REPORTER 2d, 33 (1979); Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, La nature du droit
d'auteur: droit de propri6td ou monopole?, 43 McGILL L.J. 507 (1998).
15 See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copynght and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1,
8 (1987); William Patry, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 110 (2009)
(describing how, historically, copyright in the United States has always been regarded
as a regulatory privilege, not as a property right); Mikhail Xifaras, LA PROPRII TE
ETUDE DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT411, 425 (2004) (describing copyright as a privilege);
Tom W. Bell, Copynght as Intellectual Propefty Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523
(2008).
16 Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, 1123 (Can.); see also
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, para. 82 (Can.) (whereby the Court lists
previous judgments by the Supreme Court having made the same statement).
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right,17 as a government subsidy,' 8 as property,' 9 and as akin to a
dismemberment of ownership (i.e. usufruct). 20 At first sight, the
statutory construct of copyright exhibits characteristics that are
commonly associated with property. The exclusionary rights that
copyright laws typically confer on copyright holders in relation to a
work can be assigned in whole or in part, licensed, donated, or
bequeathed as an object of commodification.2 1 Copyright holders'
exclusive rights are opposable to all,22 and, when infringed, entitle
17 SlVERINE DUSOLLIER, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS
L'UNIVERS NUMIRIQUE 322-23 (2d ed. 2007) (defining the nature of copyright (as well
as other intellectual property rights) as a limited right of exploitation to the public that
does not involve the use or enjoyment of a resource which contrasts it with property).
1 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, TEXAS L.
REV. 1031, 1069ff (2005) (making an analogy to real property, tort, government
subsidy, and government regulation, concludes that no analogy is fully adequate but
the closest one is probably a government subsidy as it underlies the trade-off at play
better than talking about it as a real property right).
19 See, e.g., Desputeaux v. tditions Chouette, [1987] 2003 S.C.C. 17, para. 57 (Can.)
("the Copyright Act deals with copyright primarily as a system designed to organize
the economic management of intellectual property, and regards copyright primarily as
a mechanism for protecting and transmitting the economic values associated with this
type of property and with the use of it"); see also Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada
Inc., [2007] S.C.C. 37, 1T1 27-39 (Can.); BMG Canada v. John Doe, [2005] F.C.A. 193,
para. 41, (Can.); Cie G6n6rale des 6tablissements Michelin v. C.A.W. Canada, [1996]
71 C.P.R. 3d, 348 (Can.). For a historical perspective on the debate around the nature
of copyright, i.e. either as a monopoly, property or creation of statute, see Harold G.
Fox, The Canadian Law of Copyrght (1944) at 7-11 (reviewing the three
characterizations of copyright and concluding that copyright is incorporeal property);
see also HARRIS, supra note 8, at 42-47; David Vaver, Canada's Intellectual Property
Framework: A Comparative Overview, 17 I.P.J. 125, 135 (2004); R. HUGHES, S.
PEACOCK & N. ARMSTRONG, HUGHES ON COPYRIGHT & INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 101 (2d
ed. 2005) (referring to copyright as intangible incorporeal property); DUSOLLI ER, supra
note 17, at 314-23 (reviewing doctrinal works qualifying copyright as property and the
various arguments for and against the qualification of copyright as property); Peter S.
Menell, The PropertyRights Movement'sEmbrace of IntellectualProperty: True Love
Or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.O. 713, 721 (2007); Richard A. Epstein,
Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO
L. R. 1 (2005); Adam Mossoff, Is copyright property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005);
Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2010).
20 See David Lametti, The Concept and Conceptions of Intellectual Property as
seen through the lens ofProperty, in Scienza e Diritto nelPrisma del Diritto Comparato
282 (G. Comand6 et al. eds., 2004) (finding some commonality between copyright and
one of the dismemberment of ownership, i.e. usufruct, acknowledging that copyright in
the end still shares the attributes of a property right).
21 See, e.g., United States Copyright Act of 1978, 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); Canada
Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 13(4)-13(7); see Fiona MacMillan, Copynght and
Corporate Power, in COPYRIGHT AND THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 99-118 (Ruth Towse
ed., 2002); Fiona MacMillan, THE CRUEL (C): COPYRIGHT AND FILM, 24 EUROPEAN
INTELL. PROP. REV. 483, 484 (2002).
22 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006); Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, § 27 (1)
("[i]t is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the
2014] 39
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copyright holders to civil remedies by way of injunction, damages,
accounts, delivery up, and that may be conferred otherwise by law.23
Copyright infringement can also give rise to criminal sanctions. 24 While
courts will at times distance copyright law from property law, 25
property and ownership parlance is commonly used to describe
- - 26copyright in judicial decisions.
While copyright shares important attributes with other forms of
property,2 7 there is an ongoing debate on the nature of copyright and
other intellectual property rights, and more particularly around the
effects of assimilating copyright to property. 28 I will deal with the
debate on the property attributes of copyright at a substantive level
below in this article. 2 9 At this point, I will limit my remarks to the
political dimension of associating copyright with property in
contemporary copyright discourse.
Commentators, including Neil Weinstock Netanel, Lawrence
Lessig, and William Patry, describe how the assimilation of copyright
to private property generally serves the proponents of strong copyright
holders' rights. 30 The analogies and metaphors employed by Jack
Valenti, as president of the Motion Picture Association of America,
equating cultural property to the strongest forms of private property
(and the need to give the former the same level of protection as the
owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has
the right to do").
23 See US Copyright Act, supra note 21, at § 502-05; Canada Copyright Act, supra
note 2, at § 34(1).
24 See US Copyright Act, supra note 21, at § 506; Canada Copyright Act, supra note
2, at §§ 42-43.
25 The Supreme Court of Canada has on numerous occasions distanced copyright
law from property law, see Blue Crest Music Inc., supra note 16, at para 23 (where
Justice Estey states, in a unanimous judgment, "copyright law is neither tort law nor
property law in classification, but is statutory law. It neither cuts across existing rights
in property or conduct, nor falls between rights and obligations heretofore existing in
the common law. Copyright legislation simply creates rights and obligations upon the
terms and in the circumstances set out in the statute").
26 See Desputeaux, supra note 19; see also Euro-Excellence Inc., supra note 19;
BMG Canada, supra note 19; Cie Gin6rale des 6tablssements Michelin, supra note 19.
27 Eg., copyright can be assigned in whole or in part, licensed, donated or
bequeathed, and copyright is opposable to all; see also discussion infra Part III.
28 See Epstein, "Liberty Versus Property" supra note 19; Mossoff, supra note 19;
Hanoch Dagan, Property and The Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 84 (2006);
DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at 309-28; MICHAEL SPENCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 13-
15 (2007); Menell, supra note 19; Patry, supra note 15, at 109-31.
29 See discussion infra Part III (on the property attributes of copyright).
30 SeeNEILWEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'SPARADOx 6-8 (2008); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 116ff (2004); Patry, supra note 15, at 109-
32.
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latter) are frequently cited examples of the use of strong tangible
property rhetoric to secure more robust intellectual property rights. 31
Lingo that is traditionally associated to tangible property, e.g. fencing-
off, theft, and piracy is frequently used with respect to intellectual
property and carries with it a powerful imagery that for some has or
may have contributed to the progressive expansion of the scope of
copyright.32
Those who favor a robust public domain, or advocate for greater
alignment between copyright entitlements and First Amendment rights
or freedom of expression, and the need to give greater consideration to
copyright users and other competing interests, warn against the dangers
of the propertization of copyright.33 It is not always clear that warnings
against associating copyright with property are necessarily a rejection
that copyright can be a form of property.34 While commentators who
point to the perils of equating copyright with other forms of tangible
property will sometimes concede that different conceptions of property
can lead to different opinions about the scope of copyright,3 5 they
generally view the association of copyright with property as a
dangerous "slippery slope" that is contributing to the progressive
expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights. 36 Because of the
31 See LESSIG, supra note 30, at 116ff; Patry, supra note 15, at 109ff.
32 Id.; NETANEL, supra note 30 (arguing that assimilating copyright to a
Blackstonian view of property is responsible for its progressive expansion).
33 See Patry, supra note 15, at 114; NETANEL, supra note 30. See also Carys Craig,
Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author's Right: A Warning Against a Lockean
Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 58 (2002) (describing the effects of the
Lockean reasoning to defend copyright, starting with the author's entitlements, and
working backwards to set its limits as opposed to starting the analysis with the public
domain and then justifying authors' right to control in terms of encouragement to
create).
34 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 6 (2001) (questioning the
need to rethink property, not questioning property perse); see alsoJAMES BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 4 (2008) (inviting us to
define the public domain and to rethink the scope of intellectual property rights, while
not rejecting the property regimes surrounding intellectual property per se, including
copyright). See also LESSIG, supra note 30, at 172.
3s See, e.g., Craig, supra note 33, at 13, 40-41.
36 See Craig, supra note 33 (warning against the detrimental effects on the copyright
system of a pervasive Lockean rights-based view of property applied to copyright in
copyright case law, that focuses on the relationship between the author and her work
as opposed to centering on the relationship between the work and the public and the
incentive-based system that needs to be put in place to encourage the creation and
dissemination of works); see also Patry, supra note 15, at 114; NETANEL, supra note 30,
at 6-8, 57-80 (detailing the various expansions of copyright in recent years (e.g. in
duration, scope, through technological protection measures), but it is not always clear,
whether such expansion is attributable to associating copyright to property). See also
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian
Copynight, Copyright's Paradox, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1138-39 (2008).
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uncertain contours of intellectual property and copyright, the
application of property reasoning to such abstract concepts or
intangibles may present an even greater danger of expansion in relation
to other forms of tangible property.37
In response to warnings against the effects of the propertization of
copyright, other commentators attribute the so-called "expansionist
effects" of qualifying copyright as property and the polarization it
creates between copyright absolutists and copyright minimalists to a
misconception of property. 3 8 Rather than a monolith of unlimited
exclusionary powers, property is a heterogeneous legal institution that
is intrinsically subject to limitations and obligations. 3 9 The property
institution can serve the interests of defenders of the public domain as
much as they do the interests of the copyright holders. In that view, the
proponents of a strong public domain stand an even better chance at
constraining copyright expansionist arguments inside the property
institution itself, rather than by invoking less-defined concepts external
to it.4
The persistence with which some commentators insist that
copyright is not property serves, at times, the overt purpose of
distancing copyright from a natural property right. 41 This motive, it
seems, confuses the nature of property with how it is sometimes
justified, e.g., as a natural right, which is not a sine qua non condition
for the existence of property.4 2 Commentators who guard against the
3 See discussion infra Part III on Cie Gndrale des dtablissements Michelin, supra
note 19; see also Craig, supra note 33, at 40-41.
38 See Dagan, supra note 28, at 86; Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in
Property and Copyright, 56 VILL. L. REV. 251 (2011); EDUARDO MOISE PENALVER &
SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS43 (2010).
39 Id. LESSIG, supra note 30, at 72 (sharing the view that copyright is property;
however emphasizing how we need to take into account the balancing of competing
interests that are at stake and define its scope accordingly).
40 See Dagan, supra note 28, at 92; Newman, supra note 38, at 278; see also David
Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 705 (2010);
David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 139 (2009); Emily
Hudson & Robert Burrell, Abandonment, Copyight and Orphaned Works: What
Does It Mean to Take the Proprietary Nature of Intellectual Property Rights
Seriously?, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 971 (2011).
41 Roberts, supra note 14, at 34, Patterson, supra note 15. Other commentators have
raised the reticence of qualifying copyright as property for political reasons including
fear of the feudalist implications that the association of intellectual work protected by
copyright with property may lead to. See XIFARAS, supra note 15, at 414. See also
PATRY, supra note 15, at 112ff.
42 Even though the existence of a natural right to property is the object of an
ongoing debate, in an Anglo-American context, instrumentalism, and in particular
utilitarianism, is often viewed as the most influential justification for the existence of
private property. SeeJEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHTTO PRIVATE PROPERTY 3 (1988).
In the United States, instrumentalist theories are often invoked to justify copyright.
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characterization of copyright as property confront a specific view of
property, including a right-based view of property that opposes any
form of regulation or interference with property, and as a powerful
right that precedes the state.43 At other times, the underlying purpose
of distancing the nature of copyright from property is to avoid the
perceived absolutism and expansionist effects associated with the prima
facie open-ended privileges and powers of property.4
A striking example of the perils of interpreting the scope of
copyright by using the analogy of strong tangible private property rights
is the judgment in Cie Gin6rale des 6tablissements Michelin v. CA. W-
Canada Michelin.4 5 The plaintiff, Michelin, sought an injunction against
defendants CAW Union and others based on trademark and copyright
infringement for the use of the Bibendum (Michelin man) logo owned
by Michelin. In an attempt to unionize the employees of Michelin
Canada, CAW Union distributed various leaflets depicting the
Bibendum logo in humorous or satirical ways. CAW Union was not
successful in arguing that its use of the Bibendum logo was permissible
46as a parody or satire.
Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress's power with respect to copyright (and patents)
is "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168,
169-73 (Stephen R. Munzer ed. 2001); SUNNY HANDA, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CANADA
75 (2002). Under HARRIS, supra note 78, theory of property, the creator-incentives
instrument is the sole plausible justification for creating private property through
copyright. Id. at 296ff.
43 See NETANEL, supra note 30, at 6-8; Patry, supra note 15, at 97-132. See also
Craig, supra note 33.
4 See, e.g., NETANEL, supra note 30; PATRY, supra note 15, at 114; see also Craig,
supra note 33 (guarding against the expansionist effects of a Lockean rights-based view
of copyright).
45 Cie G4Jndrale des &tablissements Michelin, supra note 19, at para. 84 (where the
court referred to plaintiffs Michelin's copyright in the Bibendum logo as private
property, responding to an argument by defendants that copyright had to be analogized
to a form of public property). For a discussion of this case, see Jane Bailey, Deflating
the Michelin Man: Protecting Users' Rights in the Canadian Copyright Reform
Process, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 125
(Michael Geist, ed., 2005); see also Carys Craig, Putting the Community in
Communication: Dissolving the Conflict between Freedom of Expression and
Copyight, 56 U. TORONTO L. J. 75 (2006).
46 Until the amendments to Canada's Copyright Act, in 2012, adding parody or
satire as one of the purposes under which the fair dealing exception to copyright
infringement applies, (Canada Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 4, § 21
amending § 29 of the Copyright Act, supra note 2), it did not provide an exception to
copyright infringement based on parody or satire as was already the case in other
jurisdictions. In the U.S., parody can be invoked as an exception to copyright
infringement and is assessed under the fair use doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992);
see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In France, see C.P.I.
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One of CAW Union's defences in Michelin was based on the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ' 7 arguing that their posters
and leaflets depicting the Bibendum logo were forms of expression
protected by section 2(b) of the Charter and that the Canadian
Copyright Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it forbade such
use. 48 Justice Teitelbaum, for the Federal Court (trial division) rejected
that argument, holding that "The Charter does not confer the right to
use private property-the Plaintiff's copyright-in the service of
freedom of expression." 49 The court granted injunctive relief to
Michelin, ordering CAW Union to stop using the Bibendum logo on its
leaflets.
Throughout its reasons for judgment in Michelin, the Court
emphasized the private property nature of copyright and relied on case
law that stated that the exercise of freedom of expression did not give
the right to use someone else's private property.50 Even if the Court
acknowledged that the use of the copyright (private property) of
Michelin was different from the use of private property as the location
for the exercise of the freedom of expression, it nevertheless held that
an analogy could be made between the two to ultimately conclude that
the use of private property was a prohibited form of expression under
the Charter."
By analogizing the reproduction of the Bibendum, a work
protected by copyright and as a trademark, to the use of tangible
private property, the Court failed to recognize important differences
between the nature of copyright and the nature of ownership rights in
tangible property, such as land or equipment. Among the differences,
reproduction of the Bibendum was non-rivalrous, i.e. it did not deprive
Michelin of the enjoyment of its property, nor was there any intrusion
art. L122-5 4'.
47 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982,
c. 11 (U.K.).
48 Michelin, supra note 19, at paras. 82-6. For a discussion of this judgment and on
the interaction between copyright and freedom of expression, see Craig, supra note 45.
49 Michelin, supra note 19, at para. 85.
50 Id. at paras. 94-118 (the Court referred mainly to three judgments: Committee
for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 77 D.L.R. 4th 385 (Can.); Harrison
v. Carswell, [1975], 62 D.L.R. 3d 68 (Can. Man. C.A.), and New Brunswick Broad. Co.
Ltd. v. CRTC, [1984] 2 F.C. 410 (Can. Ont.)).
51 Michelin, supra note 19, at para. 107 ("[tjhe Defendants have used private
property not as a forum but as a means of conveying a message. However, despite these
differences, I reason by analogy to Common wealth that I am permitted to consider the
parties' interests even before the Section 1 stage of the analysis in order to examine the
scope of the Defendants' freedom of expression under Section 2(b) and determine if
the expression is in a prohibited form. I hold that it is reasonable to equate doing
something on private property as a forum for expression with using the property - the
copyright - to convey expression").
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involved. The use of the Bibendum was not one that competed with the
economic rights of Michelin's copyright work, which could have
supported a form of "deprivation of enjoyment" argument by Michelin
under a tangible private property law analysis.52 The reproduction by
the defendants of Michelin's copyrighted work and trademark calls for
a different rationale than the one that withstands the balancing act at
play in cases involving the use of other forms of private property to
exercise freedom of expression. The Court was concerned to offer
copyright holders less protection than other "full property owners" on
the basis that they held an intangible right.53 The Court likely implied
the strongest form of exclusionary rights that can be conferred on
property owners, i.e. those invested with "full-blooded ownership."5 4 It
is as if the private property nature of copyright did not give the court
the choice to treat copyright differently.
Although the open-ended texture of property can lead to
expansionism, 5 this is not necessarily an account of what property is.
Property is not absolute: it is the object of various forms of limitations.56
52 The effect of the use on the work protected by copyright, e.g. its commercial
exploitation is also one of the criteria to consider to determine whether the dealing of
the work is fair or not. See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004]
S.C.R. 13, para. 59 (Can.).
53 Michelin, supra note 19, at para. 109 ("[c]opyright is an intangible property right.
The owner therefore has a more challenging task in asserting his or her control over
the use of the property. Launching an action for infringement under the aegis of the
CopyrightActis the owner's prime tool for asserting his or her rights. But just because
the right is intangible, it should not be any less worthy of protection as a full property
right" (quoting Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1
W.L.R. 273, 291 (H.L.)).
54 HARRIS, supra note 8, at 5, 30.
ss Different theoretical justifications of property can have an impact on a more
expansive or restrictive view of property. See Pascale Chapdelaine, The Copyright
Consumers' Bargain, Defining the Rights to Commercial Copies of Copyright Works
(Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, York University Graduate Program in Law, 2013)
[unpublished] at 199-224 (discussing the various theoretical justifications of
(intellectual) property and their effect on the scope of copyright and ownership of
commercial copies of copyright works).
56 For example, this principle is reflected in Qu6bec's Civil Code, "[o]wnership is
the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely, subject to the limits and
conditions for doing so determined by law." Civil Code of Qu6bec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64,
art. 947 (Can.). See also HARRIS, supra note 8, at 32-34, 37-38, 332-61(describing
various forms of limitations to property including "property-independent limitations,"
"property-limitation rules," expropriation rules and conceptual limitations to property.
A communitarian approach to property conveys the similar idea that ownership entails
obligations and thus limitations that are justified by the necessity to promote human
flourishing in the communities we live in. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo
M. Penalver, Properties of Community, 10 Theoretical Inq. L. 127, 138ff (2009),
(elaborating on the concept of dependence and obligation, i.e. that the capabilities
essential to "human flourishing," on which they base their theory of property, "cannot
be acquired by individuals in isolation by themselves"); see also Gregory S. Alexander,
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The property institution regulates a multitude of heteroclite
relationships and resources, both tangible and intangible. * The
unqualified equation of copyright with private tangible property in
Michelin reflects an absolutist and monolithic approach to property as
opposed to a contextual approach looking in each case at the
justifications or "property-specific justice reasons"58 that withstand the
property right in question. Copyright and its exceptions and limitations
should allow the mediation between copyright holders' exclusive rights
and the exercise of freedom of expression and other fundamental rights
when they come in conflict. 59 The statutory and jurisprudential
limitations on copyright holders' exclusive rights allow for the
resolution of conflicts between competing interests and, in the case of
Michelin, in a way that is even more apparent now than it was at the
time judgment was rendered.6 0 Without getting into the actual merit of
CAW Union's defence under the Charter and the tests it had to fulfill
to be successful, Michelin illustrates the pitfalls of a monolithic
absolutist property approach to copyright, and gives cause for
concern.61
To distance the nature of copyright from property is no
The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 795-
96 (2009) ("[p]rivate ownership of those aspects of a society's infrastructure upon which
the civic culture depends comes with special obligations"); Alexander, id. at 775ff, 791ff
(defining two forms of property limitations "entitlement sacrifices" and "use
sacrifices").
5 HARRIS, supra note 8, at 4, 348 (noting, "[i]t is a mistake to assume that either we
must align property in information with property in other resources or else we must
exclude information from the property agenda. Property-institutional design may be
and should be much more flexible than these alternatives allow." See also Mossoff,
supra note 19, at 40-41; Newman, supra note 38, at 79 ("[t]he problems addressed by
ownership of tangible things are not identical in all respects to those that underlie
ownership of intellectual works, and careless property-based rhetoric can lead to error.
But the areas of commonality are great, and we should not be too quick to conclude
that property is always the problem and never the solution"); Richard A. Epstein, What
is So Special about Intangible Property? The Case for Intelligent Carryovers, N.Y.U.
L. & ECON. WORKING PAPERS, Paper 243, available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_1ewp/243.
58 These are the reasons that can be invoked to justify a property institution. See
HARRIS, supra note 8, at 168.
59 One example is the objectives embedded in some of the allowable purposes of
the fair dealing or the exercise of fair use as exceptions to copyright infringement.
60 I.e., parody or satire, which could have been invoked in that case, was not a listed
purpose under the fair dealing exceptions to copyright infringement, but Canada
Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 4, added parody or satire as a listed purpose
to § 29.
61 The analysis of the potential conflicts between the exclusive rights conferred by
copyright and the First Amendment or freedom of expression, is beyond the scope of
this article. For a discussion on these conflicts, see NETANEL, supra note 30; Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom ofImagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J.
1(2012).
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guaranteed panacea against the expansionist tendencies of copyright
that we have witnessed in recent years. The declared self-standing
statutory nature of copyright in some jurisdictions 62 has not stopped it
from expanding, independently of equating copyright to property.63 In
respect of the trespassory powers and economic benefits that are
presumed to be within the domain of copyright holders, copyright is
often described as conferring inflated rights on copyright holders,
compared to other property rights. Applying economic theory, Mark
A. Lemley observes that copyright law allows copyright holders to
benefit from positive externalities of their ownership rights to a degree
that is not observed for other types of tangible property:
... society in general doesn't prohibit free riding.
Internalization of positive externalities is not necessary at all
unless efficient use of the property requires a significant
investment that cannot be recouped another way. And even
then, economic theory properly requires not the complete
internalization of positive externalities but only the capture
of returns sufficient to recoup the investment. Only where
there is a tragedy of the commons do we insist on complete
or relatively complete internalization of externalities.
This is the result, according to Lemley, of a focus by the courts on
the benefit of those externalities, i.e. "free riding," and on the
assumption that such benefits are necessarily unjust. 66
62 For example, see Compo Co., supra note 16, at para. 23; Society of Composers,
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, supra note 16, at para. 82.
63 See discussion, supra Part I (the references to the progressive expansion of
copyright); see also discussion, infra Part III. A.(i) (copyright expansionism).
6 Lemley, supra note 18, at 1033 ("[c]ourts and commentators adopt-explicitly or
implicitly- the economic logic of real property in the context of intellectual property
cases. They then make a subconscious move, one that the economic theory of property
does not justify: they jump from the idea that intellectual property is property to the
idea that the IP owner is entitled to capture the full social value of her right").
65 Lemley, supra note 18, at 1050. See also Menell, supra note 19, at 744-45, where
the author notes that one of the important differences between intellectual property
and tangible property is precisely that there is no tragedy of the commons and hence
no need that every component of the artificially created resource scarcity should
necessarily be owned.
6 Lemley, supra note 18, at 1044. In Euro-Excellence Inc., supra note 19, at para.
85, Bastarache J., in his dissenting reasons applied a similar reasoning when he
emphasized that Canada's Copyright Act does not protect all "positive externalities"
of a copyright work but "only the legitimate economic interests of copyright holders."
Bastarache J. proposed a narrower interpretation of Canada's Copyright Act, supra
note 2, at § 27(2), by seeking to define what were the legitimate economic interests of
the copyright holder in the case at hand: "Section 27(2) of the Act is meant to prohibit
secondary infringement resulting from the wrongful appropriation of the gains of
2014] 47
48 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL [Vol. X
One can think of many examples that illustrate Lemley's analysis
of copyright as capturing a large number of positive externalities. 67
Increasingly, the legitimacy of the cornerstone of copyright law, i.e. the
exclusive right to reproduce copies of copyright works, needs to be
reconsidered in the digital environment. Certain copies are not likely
to threaten the creator-incentive primary justification of copyright, for
instance, when a consumer makes copies purely for convenience
purposes. The statutory allowance in some jurisdictions that permits
users to make copies for private purposes without copyright holders'
consent and without remuneration, is a recognition that reproductions
for private purposes do not unreasonably interfere, if at all, with
copyright holders' exclusive rights.6 8 A more controversial example is
when the owners of commercial copies of copyright works make copies
for family members or close friends. It is not always clear that the
additional copies would be competing with the exclusive economic
rights of copyright holders. In other words, even had the family
members or close friends not been provided with the copy, they may
not have ever purchased the copy of the copyrighted work. Making
copies for family members or close friends can enhance other goals of
copyright and could even benefit copyright holders, for example, by
encouraging the beneficiaries of the burned copies to go to a concert or
to buy the complete CDs or download other songs from the same
musicians. 69 Nevertheless, in most cases, the rights and remedies that
generally support the exclusive right to reproduce, lead to the inference
that something is being taken away from copyright holders because
someone made additional copies of the work without authorization or
compensation.70
There are several other illustrations of copyright holders' ability
to capture the positive externalities of their ownership rights, even
another's skill and judgment by way of the acts enumerated in paras (a) to (c).
Conversely, other economic interests - although they may seem to be closely associated
with the interests legitimately protected as emanating from that skill and judgment -
are not protected. In particular, if a work of skill and judgment (such as a logo) is
attached to some other consumer good (such as a chocolate bar), the economic gains
associated with the sale of the consumer good must not be mistakenly viewed as the
legitimate economic interests of the copyright holder of the logo that are protected by
the law of copyright."
67 Lemley, supra note 18.
6 Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, §§ 29.22, 79ff.
69 See generally Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871, 1881,
1911-12 (2007), (developing parameters to help define what the scope of lawful
personal use should be in US copyright law, based on whether the use in question
enhances what the author describes as "copyright liberties" and the extent to which the
use would undermine the incentive to create). See also Chapdelaine, supra note 55, at
199-223 (discussing the theoretical justifications of copyright and copy ownership).
70 See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, §§ 3, 27, 34.
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above and beyond what tangible property would allow. For example,
the narrow application courts have given to the non-substantial-part
doctrine (or similar doctrines), which allows uses of copyright works
without copyright holders' authorization.71 Another example is the
"incidental inclusion" exception to copyright infringement (or similar
doctrine).7 2 This "incidental inclusion" exception provides a limited
exception to the inclusion of a work (e.g. a painting) in another work
(e.g. a documentary film), but only if the use of the first work is
incidental and not deliberate.73 Thus, other than for uses of the work
that are incidental and not deliberate, any other positive externalities
of a copyright work, even if quite minimal, fall within the exclusive
domain of the copyright holder. By contrast, the use of a vase or a desk
lamp not subject to copyright (or to any other intellectual property
right) is not subject to any form of restriction from the maker of the
vase or desk lamp and the vase or desk lamp can be used freely in the
documentary film, a positive benefit of owning that vase or desk lamp.
Overall, the various exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright
holders are perhaps even more revealing of the extensive scope of
copyright holders' exclusive rights than the exclusive rights conferred
by copyright law to copyright holders.7 4 To name a few, educational
institutions' specifically enumerated and carved-out exceptions,7 5 the
reproduction for private purposes exception, the later listening or
viewing exception, and the computer program limited copying
71 In Canada, the non-substantial part doctrine, derived from Canada Copyright
Act, supra note 2, § 3, is the doctrine according to which users can make any
reproduction, performance in public, or publication of a non-substantial part of
copyright works without the authorization of the copyright holders. Acts performed on
non-substantial parts of copyright works are outside the realm of copyright holders'
exclusive rights and can be performed without compensation to copyright holders and
without infringing copyright. See DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 143ff (2000);
McKEOWN, Fox ON CANADIAN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS ch. 21,
14ff (Carswell 4th ed. 2003). In the U.S., the substantial similarity test to establish
copyright infringement and the application of the de minimis principle to the doctrine
of fair use embed similar concepts to that of the non-substantial part doctrine in
Canadian copyright law: 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006), which lists the exclusive rights of
copyright holders, does not refer to the exclusive right to reproduce (and other acts)
the work or a substantial part. For a review of the case law on these two applications of
the de minimis principle in U.S. copyright law, see Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De
Minimis and a Proposal forits Application in Copynght, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945,
960-69 (2006). The author describes that in the case of fair use, the de minimis principle
applies principally to the fourth factor considered to establish fair use, i.e., "the effect
of the use on the market for, or value of, the original work."
72 See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 30.7.
73 id.
74 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-20 (2006); Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, §§ 29-
32.2. (for exceptions to copyright infringement set out in the Copyright Act).
7 See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, §§ 29.4-30.04; 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
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exceptions for compatibility and backup purposes are illustrative of the
far-reaching scope of copyright.7 6
If copyright holders benefit from even more positive externalities
than owners of other forms of tangible private property, the reason for
such expansionist tendencies must be sought elsewhere than copyright
being assimilated to property by lawmakers, the judiciary, and
commentators. Expansionism is not the proper argument to exclude
copyright from the property institution.7 7 In The Future ofIdeas, Lessig
invites us to rethink the current scope of property (including
intellectual property), as well as broader legal and other frameworks
under which we operate, to fully seize the opportunity and face the
challenges of the Internet revolution. 8 For Lessig, the concept of
property as the basis on which prosperity has been made possible is
confusing us, but to question the scope of property is not to question
property itself.79
To adequately respond to mischaracterizations or misplaced
applications of underlying concepts of property, the debate on the
nature of copyright needs to center on substantive considerations. It
would be misguided and confusing not to call copyright property simply
for fear that the designation of copyright as a form of property interest
will lead to absolutism, if copyright shares the attributes of property at
a substantive level. It is not so much the propertization of copyright that
may lead to expansionism, but rather a misinformed application of the
concept of property to copyright, and the view that overlooks the
existence of equally meritorious competing property rights and the
operation of property's intrinsic limitations. 80 As I argued above,
distancing copyright from property is no safeguard against copyright's
progressive expansion.81 The sui generis nature of copyright can be
invoked to limit its scope as much as it can be invoked to expand it.82
The proper application of the property framework to copyright may in
fact lead to more constraining effects on the scope of copyright than
would otherwise be the case.83
76 See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, §§ 29.22-29.23, 30.4.
77 PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 38, at 39, 42 (describing intellectual property
as being distinct from and far more complex than tangible property, while at the same
time sharing important similarities with tangible property).
78 LESSIG, supra note 34, at 5-6.
79 Id. at 5-6; see also LESSIG, supra note 30, at 172.
so Newman, supra note 38, at 259-67.
81 See discussion supra Part II.
82 id
8' See Newman, supra note 38 (reflecting on the nature of property and on how it
commands standardized and predictable rules that are not subject to the personal
preferences of others; demonstrating how the application of a rigorous and
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The peculiarity of copyright and the strong political undercurrents
surrounding its nature make the study of copyright through the lens of
property law and theory all the more valuable, in an effort to debunk
misconceptions about property and how its inept application may
contribute to an inflation of copyright. For instance, what is the
resource within copyright that can be the object of property and what
is the nature of copyright holders' powers and privileges over the
physical embodiments of their works that are owned by consumers and
other users? These are among the questions that an investigation into
the property attributes of copyright seeks to answer.
III. THE PROPERTY ATTRIBUTES OF COPYRIGHT
The abstract nature of copyright, that is, its uncontained
simultaneous reach to multiple objects owned by different persons,
offers a field of study of high interest to property and copyright
theorists alike. Copyright, like other forms of intellectual property,
challenges our common understanding of property as it relates to
tangible resources. My objective here is to examine the property
attributes of copyright primarily through James Harris theory of
property in Property and Justice," with the aim to respond to some of
the fears about the assimilation of copyright to property discussed
earlier.8 5 The application of the ownership spectrum developed by
James Harris and its focus on the person-to-resource relationship,
allows me to separate two distinct features of copyright that previously
tend to have been blended or overshadowed by the right to exclude:86
the bundle of rights as an object of commodification, and the more
limited rights that copyright holders have with respect to copies of
copyright works.
consequentialist property approach to copyright would constrain rather than expand
the current scope of the exclusive rights that copyright confers).
84 See HARRIS, supra note 8. Commentators have examined the property attributes
of copyright through James Harris' theory. See, e.g. Lior Zemer, "What Copyright is:
Time to Remember the basics" 4 BuFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 54 (2006). While other
commentators examine the property attributes of intellectual property and copyright,
more generally, within the property institution. See, e.g., James E Penner, THE IDEA
OF PROPERTY IN LAW 118-20 (1997); HARRIS, supra note 8, at 42-46; SPENCE, supra note
28, at 13-16; DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at 314-21; Lametti, supra note 20; PENALVER
& KATYAL, supra note 38, at 39-50.
85 See discussion supra Part II.
86 See Gordon, supra note 10, at 1366 (examining the property entitlements of
copyright through the right to exclude, the privilege to use, and the power to transfer
copyright; emphasizing the right to exclude as a predominant feature of property and
copyright); see also Breakey, supra note 10.
87 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 5 (stating the ownership spectrum spans from "mere
property" to "full-blooded ownership").
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James Harris defines the essence of every property institution as
the twin manifestation of trespassory rules88 and the existence of an
ownership spectrum. 89 The various forms of ownership share in
common: (i) a juridical relation between a person and a resource," (ii)
privileges and powers that are open ended9' and (iii) that authorize
self-seekingness by the owner. Harris influential conception of
property93 offers one among numerous accounts of the main attributes
of property and of the nature of ownership.94 The "twin-manifestation"
framework that Harris proposes to define property emphasizes the
"bundle of rights" characteristic that is often ascribed to property, as
well as supported by the power to exclude, opposable to all. 95
Commentators have defined the distinctive nature of property in
different ways: e.g. as being the power to exclude more than the bundle
88 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 25, 87 (defining "trespassory rules" as all rules
which, by reference to a resource, impose any obligations upon an open ended range
of persons, with the exception of some privileged individual, group, or agency. They
are open-ended, and give rise to various civil or criminal remedies such as damages,
possessory recovery, injunction or restitution, and they presuppose the existence of a
separate, reasonably identifiable resource).
89 Id. at 5 (stating the ownership spectrum spans from "mere property" to "full-
blooded ownership").
90 This implies the ability to identify each and separateness between the two. See
HARRIS, supra note 8, at 332; Penner, supra note 84, at 105-28.
91 See, e.g., Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 947 (Can.) (defining the
right of ownership as "the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely,
subject to the limits and conditions for doing so determined by law").
92 See HARRIS supra note 8, at 65 (explaining that self-seekingness refers to this
intimate relationship between the owner and the resource as to how she chooses to
dispose of the resource, with prima facie no duty to account to any one for the merit or
rationality of that preference).
93 See PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS (Endicott et al. eds.,
2006).
94 See TONY HONORE, OWNERSHIP IN TONY HONORE MAKING LAW BIND, ESSAYS
LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161, 165-79 (1987) (discussing the concept of ownership
and providing a detailed account of the incidents of ownership which include, the right
to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income and capital of
the thing, the right to security and the duty to prevent harm; see also JAMES 0.
GRUNEBAUM, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP (1st ed. 1987) (developing a theory of
"autonomous ownership" that is divided in three main categories based on the nature
of the resource that is owned, i.e., domains of land and resources, domains of self and
labour and the domain of "mixed ownables").
9 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 5 (describing property institutions as encompassing
the twin manifestation of trespassory rules and the presence of an ownership spectrum
which comprises powers and privileges between a person and a resource that are prima
facie open-ended).
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or rights and vice versa, 96 or both97, or neither. 98 Conceptions of
property include the "thing" 99 or a relation; either person-to-person,1oo
person-to-things, 101 or person-to-person through things. 102 The
emphasis on certain characteristics over others involves selecting and
discriminating among concepts that reflect diverse values. 103 One
should guard against attempts to impose too much uniformity when
describing property, as uniformity can limit its ability to adapt and
evolve. 104 Rather, each form of property right needs to be
contextualized in accordance with its underlying objectives and the
96 See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 42, at 294 (stating that the essential
characteristics of property are, the right to exclude others from the use of a resource,
the exclusive right to determine what shall be done with a resource, and the power to
alienate one's rights over a resource on whatever terms one thinks appropriate;
emphasizing how the freedom of choice in the economic sphere is of paramount
importance). See also HONORt, supra note 94; STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY, 22-7 (1990) (building upon the works of Hohfeld and Honord; emphasizing
the bundle of incidents of property as they relate to objects).
9 HARRIS, supra note 8, would likely fall in that category.
9 See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, 40-1 (2011).
9 See MUNZER, supra note 96, at 16-17 (describing this definition of property as
the laymen's view as opposed to a more sophisticated view of property which defines it
through relationships between persons and objects). See also Henry E. Smith, Property
as the law of things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012) (criticizing the bundle of stick or
bundle of rights theories of property and argues that we need to replace the "thing" at
the centre of property as a "law of modular things" as supported or explained through
information costs justifications).
1oo See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); HARRIS, supra
note 8, at 121-24(reviewing Hohfeld's theory of property interests to conclude that
Hohfeld's account of property interests that focuses on relationships is incomplete and
explains why we cannot dispense of the person-thing relationship). See also MUNZER,
supra note 96, at 17-22 (analyzing and critiquing Hohfeld's contribution to defining the
dynamics within property).
1o1 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 142 (viewing property as "interests in things"). For
a discussion on the theories emphasizing the "person to person" and "person to thing"
essential characteristics of property, see Lisa Austin, Person, Place, Or Thing?Property
And The Structuring Of Social Relations, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 445 (2010).
102 See David Lametti, Concept of Property: Relations through Objects of Social
Wealth, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 325, 355 (2003). For an overview of different conceptions
on the nature of property, see Munzer, supra note 96, at 16-17. For a recent review of
the various theories and ongoing debates about the nature and main characteristics of
property, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 531,541-51 (2005).
103 See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 98, at 44 (explaining how an over emphasis on the
power to exclude as the rule and the limitations as exceptions evacuates the notion of
social responsibility embedded in property). See also Lametti, supra note 102, at 377.
' See DAGAN, supra note 98, at 43 (stating that too much uniformity "would
undermine the freedom-enhancing pluralism and the individuality-enhancing
multiplicity so crucial to the liberal ideal of justice").
2014] 53
54 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL [Vol. X
nature of the resource to which it pertains.105 According to Harris, we
need to understand the underlying "property-specific justice reasons"
that withstand each form of property to determine its proper scope. 106
Harris' tailored approach to the nature of the resource and the
underlying reasons for its legal protection is highly pertinent to our
discussion on the effect of characterizing copyright as property. Harris'
"one size does not fit all" account of property invites us to look at the
nature of the resource, e.g. copyright, enabling the differentiation of
copyright from tangible property.
To what extent are the features that are common on the ownership
spectrum described by Harris present in the case of copyright, and to
what extent does copyright give rise to trespassory powers? In answer
to the second question, copyright confers a list of exclusive rights on
copyright holders with respect to their works, with correlative
trespassory powers that are opposable to all.'" Copyright law dictates
when primary and secondary infringements to copyright occur,'10 as
well as the remedies that are available to copyright holders.109 The
remedies for copyright infringement include injunction, statutory and
other damages, accounts, and delivery up.110 Further, criminal sanctions
can be imposed, i.e. fines or imprisonment.!1 I
To answer the first question, i.e. the extent to which copyright
shares the characteristics that are common to all ownership interests, I
will apply each of the three features on the ownership spectrum to
determine whether copyright shares the basic characteristics of
property as a resource that can be owned.1 2 I will then consider how
copyright interferes with the personal property rights of owners of
commercial copies of copyright works and will complete the analysis of
the property attributes of copyright by a discussion on the
standardization of property."13
105 Id. at 42.
106 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 168.
107 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-11 (2006); Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at §§
27-28.2 (enumerating the primary and secondary infringements of copyright and of
moral rights "for any person" who does certain acts without the consent of the
copyright holder).
108 Id.
' See 17 U.S.C. §§ 505, 509-10 (2006); Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at §
34ff.
110 Id
"' See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006); Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 42(1)
(allowing a fine of up to one million dollars imprisonment not exceeding five years upon
conviction or indictment).
112 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 5.
113 See discussion infra Parts III.B and Part III. C.
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A. Copyright on the Ownership Spectrum
i. Juridical relation between a person and a resource
The requirement of a juridical relation between a person and a
resource on the ownership spectrum implies that the person and the
resource can be identified, as well as separateness between the two.114
Every property institution also implies a scarcity in resources and an
exercise of wealth allocation. 115 In the case of copyright, the state
creates an artificial scarcity through copyright laws, to prohibit the
unauthorized reproduction and other acts that could otherwise be
performed freely with respect to a work of authorship.' 16
Copyright statutes frequently refer to the "ownership of
copyright" or "copyright owners." 117 Without getting into the
requirements of authorship, in relation to copyright, the person is
generally identifiable as the author (joint authors) or other copyright
holder(s) of the work.' 18 Views diverge on the resource with which the
author or copyright holder has a legal relationship. Commentators
looking into the property attributes of copyright have referred to the
resource or property as being the intangible work,11 9 or the bundle of
exclusive rights,120 or the monopoly that copyright confers.12'
114 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 332; Penner, supra note 84, at 105-28 (requirement
for any property institution).
115 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 24.
116 Id. at 42-3; Lemley, supra note 18, at 1055.
117 See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 2 (referring to "exclusive
distributor" and "infringing"); §§ 2.2, 2.7, 3, 14, 17, 24, 27, 27.1 (referring to ownership
in relation to copyright); 17 U.S.C. §§ 201-05 (2006) (titled "Copyright Ownership and
Transfer"); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c 48, §§ 2, 16 (U.K.) (referring
to the exclusive rights of the "owner of copyright" or "copyright owner").
118 See, e.g. Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 13 (providing that the author
of the work is the first owner of the copyright therein, as well as the circumstances
under which the first owner of the copyright in the work is a person other than the
author (e.g., the employer)); §§ 6.1, 6.2, 77 (addressing situations where the author is
unknown or cannot be located). See also 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (discussing the
difficulties that arise in the identification of authors of works and other creators in
intellectual property law); SPENCE, supra note 28, at 25-9.
119 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 8, at 42-8 (referring to the object protected by
intellectual property as "ideational entities"). See also DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at
316-21 (reviewing the various theories on the nature of copyright and also the
conceptual difficulties around the qualification of copyright as property).
120 See SPENCE, supra note 28, at 15-16; DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at 316-21
(reviewing the various theories and also the conceptual difficulties around the
qualification of copyright as property; citing proponents of that view like H.-J. LUCAS,
TRAITI DE LA PROPRIETE LITrTRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 31, (A. Lucas et. al. eds., 2d ed.
Paris 2001)
121 See Penner, supra note 84, at 118-20 (reviewing and critiquing various
characterizations of the "thing" or property, when analyzing copyright as a form of
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Each of the propositions describing the object of property that is
owned in the case of copyright is deficient to some extent. To claim that
copyright holders own their work is problematic to the extent that their
correlative trespassory powers do not forbid uses by others of their
works once they are published. 122 One of the core objectives of
copyright is to encourage the dissemination of works. 123 The
trespassory powers that copyright confers on copyright holders once
their works are published only allow them to restrict others from
performing specific acts on their works. 12 4 To state that the object of
copyright holders' ownership is a monopoly is also deficient to the
extent that it does not describe adequately the powers and privileges
that copyright confers. 125 It is also somewhat disappointing to claim that
copyright holders' ownership pertains to a bundle of exclusive rights,
for the same reason that to describe property through rights and
relationships without reference to a resource is somewhat defective and
incomplete.126 Failure to take into account the role of the resource and
the dynamics that revolve around the resource leaves out important
distinctive features that set property apart from other legal
institutions.127
The shortcomings of characterizing the resource that copyright
holders can own as the intangible work or as the bundle of exclusive
rights diminish when we combine the two objects: the resource with
which authors or copyright holders have a direct legal relationship is
property); SPENCE, supra note 28, at 13-16. See also DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at 317-
21 (discussing different approaches in qualifying copyright as property, either through
the intangible work or through the bundle or exclusive rights that copyright law confers
to authors).
122 See Penner, supra note 84, at 118-19; SPENCE, supra note 28, at 13-14. See also
Lametti, supra note 20, at 279-82; DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at 318-21.
123 See U.S. Const., art. I., § 8 (providing that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power. .. [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries"); see also Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Th6berge, [2002] S.C.C.
34, para. 30 (Can.).
124 See SPENCE, supra note 28, at 13-14. A distinction needs to be made between
published works and unpublished works. In the latter case, the trespassory powers of
authors to their works are greater. See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 43-4.
125 See SPENCE, supra note 28, at 15 (observing that a monopoly generally denotes
an undue power on specific products in a given market and that it is unlikely that
copyright would ever have that effect, given its protection to specific works of art (and
given that copyright protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves)).
126 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 8, at 121-24 (stating we cannot dispense of the
"person-thing" relationship to describe property and critiquing Hohfeld's theory of
property based on the correlation of rights; in the context of the characterization of
copyright, see also DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at 317-18.
127 id
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the bundle of exclusive rights as they relate to the work.128 When
copyright holders license or assign their copyright, it is the work, with
its unique attributes and qualities that is the object of interest and
scrutiny. The work, while not the object of ownership perse, cannot be
evacuated from the "person-thing" relationship and is necessary, both
as an intangible entity and in its material form, for an ownership
interest to arise.
While copyright is generally associated with incorporeal or
intangible property, 129 it exists only to the extent that a creation
materializes and becomes a work, which attaches a corporeal or
physical element to copyright. The fixation requirement warrants
eligible worksl30 to be fixedin some materially identifiable form to be
protected by copyright.' 31 The separateness of copyright in the work
from the copyright holder and from all others is fulfilled by the fixation
requirement, which is consistent with the idea-expression dichotomy,
i.e. the fact that copyright protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas
themselves.13 2 As a result, the resource with which copyright holders
have a legal relationship is the bundle of exclusive rights as they relate
to the work as materialized
Pinning down more precisely the resource that copyright holders
own is not a trivial exercise. The exercise reveals that the work per se
cannot effectively be the object of ownership in property terms and
reveals the inadequacy of ownership of the work as inaccurate property
parlance. Applying property concepts to copyright by reference to
ownershio of the work expands the nature of copyright beyond what it
is and ever was. Copyright holders cannot own their work: the nature
of copyright makes this relationship between copyright holders and
lawful copies of their work impossible. However the progressive
expansion of the scope of protection of copyright, in particular, the
introduction of technological protection measures, the exclusive right
of creators to control the distribution of copies of their works, the
128 See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at §§ 3, 15, 18, 21, 26; SPENCE,
supra note 28, at 15 (conveying a similar idea but seems to focus more on the exclusive
rights conferred by copyright as being the object of ownership; however, the link to the
underlying work as part of the object is not stated explicitly).
129 See Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 899 (Can.); R. HUGHES, S.
PEACOCK & N. ARMSTRONG, supra note 19, at 101.
130 E.g., Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, § 5 (stating copyright shall subsist in
"every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work" that fulfills the
requirements of the Act); see also 17 U.S.C §§ 102-03.
131 See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 2 ("Fixation" is not defined in the
Act, however, the Act requires, explicitly, that computer programs, dramatic works
and sound recordings be fixed to fall under the application of the Act).
132 See Lametti, supra note 20, at 279; Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc., supra
note 123, at paras. 25, 145.
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make-available right, and the rental right, created an unprecedented
rapprochement between copyright holders and their works.'33
While copyright requires a work to take a fixed physical form to
exist, the material embodiment of the work (e.g. copies of books,
musical recordings, films, etc.) is an entity separate from copyright.134
Copyright and the material embodiment(s) of the work that copyright
protects are generally owned by different parties, i.e. copyright holders
own the copyright in the work while consumers and other buyers own
the books, musical recordings, DVD films, or computer program CDs
that embody the protected work.135 At the same time, copyright confers
privileges and powers on copyright holders on the copies and material
embodiments of works which I will discuss below.13 The insight that
copyright holders do not own their work in property terms is a powerful
response to counter the claim that copyright holders are entitled to
control every access, use, transfer of their works. Expansionist views of
the scope of copyright are increasingly made possible through new
technological means of control and dissemination of works and
completely trivialize the inherent tension that has always subsisted
between the competing property rights of users and copyright holders.
Unlike other forms of property, the juridical relation that subsists
between copyright holders and copyright is limited in time. When the
term of copyright expires, the work it protected falls into the public
domain. The limited duration of a right is no stranger to the property
institution. For example, in the civil law tradition, the real rights of
emphyteusis and usufruct (each considered as a dismemberment of the
133 See Chapdelaine, supra note 55, at 96-102, 149-55 (discussing the progressive
expansion of copyright in subject matter, scope and enforcement mechanisms, as well
as technological protection measures).
134 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (providing "[o]wnership of a copyright, or of any
of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material
object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object,
including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself
convey any rights in the copyright work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of
an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under
a copyright convey property rights in any material object"). In France, see Code of
Intellectual Prop. art L.111-3 (making the distinction clear: the intangible property
defined by article L.111 - 1 is independent of the ownership of the material
object.. .[t]hese rights remain in the person of the author or his successors in title who,
however, may not require the owner of the material object their provision of this object
for the exercise said rights).
135 id.
136 See discussion infra Part III. B.
137 See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 6. But see, Xifaras, supra note 15,
at 411 (who views the limited duration of copyright as incompatible with the concept of
property).
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right of ownership) have a limited duration of up to 100 years. 138 In the
case of copyright, the law artificially extinguishes the resource by
conferring a limited duration to copyright, allowing the property rights
subsisting in it to expire. 13 9 During the term of copyright, a juridical
relation subsists between copyright holders and copyright, which fulfills
the first characteristic common to all forms of ownership on the
ownership spectrum.'40
ii. Open-ended privileges and powers
The second feature common to all ownership interests on the
ownership spectrum is that the privileges and powers that a person has
in a resource are prima fade open-ended.141 The open-ended texture of
powers and privileges distinguishes ownership interests from other
non-ownership proprietary interests that confer specific privileges and
powers. 142 At first sight, the list of exclusive rights that copyright
confers on copyright holders to perform or authorize certain acts with
respect to their works have a closed texture to them, 14 3 which for some
commentators disqualifies copyright as a form of property.'" While
copyright confers a defined list of exclusive rights, the manner by which
copyright holders can share, exploit, license, subdivide, and transfer
copyright is open-ended.4 5 Copyright holders can "use" their copyright
by modifying and adapting the work protected by copyright or by
producing derivative works from it. They also have the freedom not to
make use of the copyright, which, unlike other forms of intellectual
property, does not lead to the possible extinction of the right. 14 6 There
138 See Civil Code of Qu6bec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1119, 1123, 1197 (Can.). -
139 The instrumental incentive-based justification of copyright supports a limited
duration of copyright, i.e. the period necessary to incentivize creation and
dissemination of works.
140 See also DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at 316-17 (rejecting the argument that the
limited duration of copyright should discard the qualification of copyright as a form of
property).
141 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 5.
142 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 8, at 55-58 (easements would fall under the category
of non-ownership proprietary interests).
143 See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at §§ 3, 15, 18, 21, 26 (listing the
exclusive rights conferred on copyright holders); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
144 See, e.g., DUSOLLIER, supra note 17, at 319.
145 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 42-46. See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Alienability and Copyright Law, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 161 (Helena Howe et al. eds., 2013) (emphasizing that the power to
alienate and subdivide in infinite ways the bundle of exclusive rights conferred by
copyright as an important feature of copyright).
146 For example, in Canada, the absence of the use of a trade-mark for an extended
period of time can lead to it being expunged from the trade-marks registry. Canada
Trade-Marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, § 45(3) (Can.).
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is also an open-ended texture to copyright, in that the exclusive powers
it confers can give rise to legal interpretation and uncertainty. 147 While
copyright confers a defined list of exclusive rights on copyright holders,
it allows a broad range of privileges and powers of exploitation and
myriad interchangeable scenarios that have an open-ended texture to
them. From that perspective, the second characteristic that is required
for an interest to be on the ownership spectrum is met.
iii. Privileges and powers that authorize self-seekingness to the
owner
The third feature common to all ownership interests on the
ownership spectrum is that the privileges and powers that a person has
in the resource confers privileges and powers that authorize self-
seekingness for the owner. 148 Self-seekingness is the intimate
relationship between the owner and the resource as to how the owner
chooses to dispose of the resource, with prima facle no duty to account
to any one on the merit or rationality of that preference. 149 By its
design, copyright confers self-seekingness on copyright holders.so It is
a central feature of the operation of copyright that copyright holders
may decide how, when, and to whom they want to dispose of copyright,
with no duty to account to any one on the merit or rationality of that
choice.15 ' As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Robertson v
Thomson Corp, 15 on the issue of whether freelance authors had
impliedly or not licensed the right to the Globe and Mail newspaper to
republish their articles in electronic databases: "parties are, have been,
and will continue to be, free to alter by contract the rights established
by the Copynght Act."153 While the modalities for the exercise of self-
147 See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 3 (stating "'Copyright', in relation
to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work.. .and includes the
sole right.. .") (emphasis added); see also Menell, supra note 19, at 744-45.
148 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 5.
149 Id. at 65.
150 Id. at 46.
151 For instance, Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 13(4) provides: "The
owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right, either wholly or partially, and
either generally or subject to limitations relating to territory, medium or sector of the
market or other limitations relating to the scope of the assignment, and either for the
whole term of the copyright or for any other part thereof'; Id. at § 14.1(1) also supports
the self-seekingness interest aspect of copyright through moral rights, i.e., the right to
the integrity of the work and the right to be associated with the work, which can be
invoked by authors (i.e. physical persons). However, moral rights perse are inalienable
(but they can be waived). Id. at § 14.1(2); see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006).
152 Robertson v. Thompson Corp., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363 (Can.).
153 Id. at 385. Other cases illustrate the broad freedom that copyright holders have
on the terms under which they make their copyright works commercially available,
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seekingness may vary between an individual author and a corporate
copyright holder, self-seekingness is present in both cases.154
To sum up, in addition to conferring trespassory powers, copyright
shares to a large extent the three characteristics that are common on
Harris's ownership spectrum. There is a juridical relation between
copyright holders and copyright that confers powers and privileges that
have a certain prima facie open-ended texture and that authorize self-
seekingness to copyright holders. While copyright displays unique
features, it fulfills the characteristics that are common on the ownership
spectrum as a resource that can be owned. From a property theory
perspective, copyright holders' powers and privileges to the
embodiments of their works display specific characteristics that I will
now investigate further.
B. Copyright Holders'Powers and Pivileges to Embodiments of
Their Works
I have argued above that the resource to consider when assessing
whether copyright shares the attributes commonly associated with
property is the bundle of exclusive rights that copyright law confers on
a work as materialized.15 It is the combination of the exclusive rights
and their relation to the work as materialized (not the work itself, or
the physical embodiment of the work) that together form a species of
intangible personal property. 156 The physical embodiment through
which copyright and the work it protects come to life (e.g. the books,
musical recordings, film DVDs) is not the resource on which copyright
holders exercise their prima facie open-ended powers and privileges, as
with other forms of tangible property.1 57 The physical embodiments of
copyright works are separate resources, that is, distinct forms of
personal property.158
beyond the terms of their constitutive legislative act. For example, cases where courts
uphold the characterization made by copyright holders of the transaction on the copy
of a copyright work as a license, rather than as a sale. See Vernor vAutodesk, Inc., 621
F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Pascale Chapdelaine, The Ambiguous Nature of
Copyright Users' Rights, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 1, at 15-28 (2013) (discussing the
interaction between copyright as conferred by statute and copyright holders' exercise
of freedom of contract).
154 I.e., corporations may be subject to internal rules of governance or specific
authorizations that would affect how they would make decisions with respect to the
exclusive copyright that they hold in a work but to the outside world, they generally
have open-ended powers and privileges in how they exploit the copyright they hold,
with no duty to account for the preference of their choice.
155 See discussion supra Part III. A(i).
156 Id.
157 See discussion supra Part III. A(ii).
158 Id. This is after the first publication has occurred. Before the first publication of
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In addition to the immediate powers and privileges that copyright
holders have with respect to copyright, copyright holders have remote
specific rights over the material embodiments of their works.159 The
rights that copyright confers on copyright holders in the embodiments
of their works owned by consumers and other users have been
compared to a negative easement,160 with the difference that in the case
of copyright, the property interest pertains to the personal property of
others and not real property.' 6' Others have made an analogy of the
relationship copyright holders have with the embodiment of their
works to a usufruct, one of the dismemberments of ownership in the
civil law tradition.162 The remedies available to copyright holders in
case of infringement include injunctive relief, and gaining physical
control over embodiments of works, such as by seizure and delivery up
of infringing copies of copyrighted works. 6 3
While the bundle of exclusive rights that copyright law confers on
a work as materialized displays the attributes of property with prima
facie open-ended powers and privileges in how copyright holders
exploit it,'6 copyright holders' specific rights to interfere with the
physical embodiment of their works as owned by consumers and other
users are specific and remote and do not have the prima facle open-
ended texture that is common to all ownership interests on the
the work, the exclusive right to authorize the first publication confers exclusionary
powers on the physical embodiment of the work as well. See HARRIS, supra note 8, at
43-44.
159 Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Plivacy?, 2002 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 375, 377 (2010) (stating "copyright law gives copyright owners
(some) rights in things as proxies for rights in works").
160 See Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L.
REV. 61, 106 (2009) (stating that a distinction needs to be made between negative
easements that arise from the existence of copyright and negative easements or
servitudes in commercial copies of copyright works that are potentially created by
copyright holders through contract).
161 Except for some copyright works, e.g. architectural works. Servitudes typically
apply to real property and courts have been reluctant to enforce servitudes on personal
property or chattels. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the La w of Property: The Numerus ClaususPrinciple, 110 YALE L.J.
1, 18 (2000); Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1449
(2003); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008).
162 Lametti, supra note 20, at 281-82 (highlighting how copyright holders cannot use
the physical embodiment of their work owned by others (usus) unless they
simultaneously own the physical embodiment of the copyright work together with the
copyright; while copyright holders control, to a large extent, the economic activity that
can be performed with that physical embodiment of the copyright work (e.g.,
reproduction and some rental rights) (fructus), they do not control the transfer of the
physical embodiment when such physical embodiment is owned by another party and
that they had authorized the first sale of that physical embodiment (abusus)).
163 See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 34(1).
164 See discussion supra Part III. A(ii).
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ownership spectrum. 165 Copyright holders' close-ended and remote
powers on the embodiments of their works, owned by consumers and
other users, are a form of non-ownership proprietary interest.166 The
constrained non-ownership proprietary interest in the embodiment of
works contrasts with expansive property language whereby copyright
holders own their work. 167
As commercial copies of copyrighted works distributed online lose
their physical object embodiment, as non-negotiated standard end-user
agreements increasingly provide that copyright holders retain
ownership in the copies, and given the uncertain application of the
exhaustion or first sale doctrine, the rights of copyright holders over the
physical copies of their works made available to consumers are
potentially expanding. 168 The new methods of distribution of
commercial copies of copyright works raise questions related to the
nature of copyright holders' interest in the copies. Can copies with no
physical object embodiment be owned? If so, do copyright holders
effectively retain ownership in the copies they distribute as provided by
the terms of the contract? In the case of commercial copies made
available to consumers for an indefinite duration (in contrast with a
service), it seems that copyright holders' rights over the copies would
still lack the open-endedness that distinguishes ownership from other
property interests, regardless of the terms of contract. 69 Copyright
holders' rights in commercial copies distributed online with contract
terms restricting consumers' ability to transfer their copies would create
an interest akin to a non-ownership proprietary interest, to the extent
that such restrictions are valid and enforceable. 170
Copyright holders' rights in relation to the embodiment of works
owned by consumers are a non-ownership proprietary interest that is
165 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 55-58 (stating non-ownership proprietary interests
are specific, as they lack the prima facie open-ended powers and privileges generally
associated with ownership interests, e.g. easements are non-ownership proprietary
interests).
166 id
167 See discussion supra Part III. A(i) (elaborating on the resource to which
copyright holders have a legal relationship as not being the copyright work itself and
the consequences thereof).
168 See Chapdelaine, supra note 55, at 84-90 (discussing the effects of the current
application of exhaustion or the first sale doctrine; see also Chapdelaine, supra note
153 (discussing the interaction between copyright, contracts, and technological
protection measures).
169 See discussion supra Part III. A(ii); Chapdelaine, supra note 55, at 287-97
(discussing the distinction between goods and services and how it is inconsistently
applied to commercial copies of copyright works).
170 See Chapdelaine, supra note 55, at 237-49, 305-12 (discussing the scope of the
exhaustion or first sale doctrine, and the interaction between copyright, contracts and
technological protection measures).
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being transformed in the online distribution environment. I will now
turn to the standardization of property and how copyright fares with
the numerus clausus principle.
C Copyright and the Standardization of Property
The standardization of property, or numerus clausus, is the
principle by which there is a fixed and closed list of property interests
recognized by law and as one corollary, limits how owners can alter the
nature of their property rights.' 7' This concept is generally understood
to be part of the civil law tradition, although it is not immune from
inconsistencies in its application.' 72 The civil law typically enumerates
the entitlements of ownership1 73 and its possible dismemberments. 174
The restriction on exercising "the right to dispose of property" is
explicitly prohibited, except in limited circumstances,' 75 and is subject
to specific conditions.' There is a growing recognition that a similar
principle exists in the common law of property.177 Thomas Merrill and
Henry Smith conducted a survey to demonstrate that the same
principle exists in the common law of property, although not uniformly
and without bearing any specific appellation.'7 8 For Merrill and Smith,
numerus clausus is best described as a "norm of judicial self-
governance" rather than as a statutory or constitutional tool of
interpretation. 179 I will focus here on how copyright, as a form of
property sits with the numerus clausus principle. There are many other
171 See HARRIS, supra note 8, at 58.
172 Lametti, supra note 102, at 360-61 (discussing how numerus clausus applies in the
Qudbec civil law system).
1 See Civil Code of Qudbec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 947 (Can.) (defining ownership
as "the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely .... ).
174 See Civil Code of Qu6bec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1119 (Can.) (listing the
dismemberments of ownership as "usufruct, use, servitude and emphyteusis" and
confirming that they are real rights).
175 See Civil Code of Qudbec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1212 (Can.) (prohibiting
restrictions on this right, except by gift or will).
176 Id. (stating that the stipulation must be in writing and is only valid "if it is
temporary and justified by a serious and legitimate interest"); see also Civil Code of
Qu6bec, S.O. 1991, c. 64, art. 1214 (Can.) (providing that the stipulation "may not be
set up against third persons unless it is published in the proper register").
177 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 161; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002). See also Dagan, supra note 28, at
4 (supporting the numerus clausus principle within the institutions of property).
178 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 161, at 9-23.
179 Id. at 11 ("Jurisprudentially speaking, the numerus clausus functions in the
common law much like a canon of interpretation, albeit a canon that applies to
common-law decision making rather than statutory or constitutional interpretation, or
like a strong default rule in the interpretation of property rights").
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aspects to numerus clausus that I will not discuss here, including how
the principle can serve the function of calibrating the effects of the
property regime created by copyright statutes and copyright holders'
freedom of contract.'8 0
Copyright may not fare so well on the terrain of the numerus
clausus principle compared to other forms of property.18' On the one
hand, certain features of copyright fulfill, it would seem, the
requirements of the numerus clausus principle. Copyright like other
forms of intellectual property, are relatively well-known and stable
forms of property.18 2 The list of exclusive rights that copyright confers
on copyright holders is reasonably well-defined and identifiable.' 83
Copyright holders can assign their copyright in whole or in part (e.g.
with respect to the exercise of one exclusive right only), and for partial
assignments copyright law treats the assignee and assignor as copyright
holders for the part assigned and for the part retained.184 The assignee
is then free to assign his copyright (or partial copyright) to subsequent
assignee(s). An analogy can be made between partial assignments and
divided co-ownership of tangible property. 185 There are formality
requirements for copyright assignments to be valid which corroborate
to some extent the standardization of property.' 86 While copyright law
confers on copyright holders broad discretionary powers as to how they
can authorize others to perform the acts reserved to them by copyright
180 Id. at 5-6 (stating the numerus clausus is "an extremely important qualification
to the freedom of contract." Through the application of numerus clausus, courts will
generally be reluctant to enforce contracts that are meant to alter the bundle of rights
that apply to a resource in a form other than known property rights).
181 See Newman, supra note 160, at 105ff.
182 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 161, at 19 (noting the protection of intellectual
property by statute, specifically, patents and copyrights are stable forms of property,
and within the U.S., the federal pre-emption doctrine restricts alterations of IP interests
at the state level).
183 See U.S.C. § 106 (2006). See also Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at §§ 3,
15, 18, 21, 26.
184 See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 13(5) (stating "where, under any
partial assignment of copyright, the assignee becomes entitled to any right comprised
in copyright, the assignee, with respect to the rights so assigned, and the assignor, with
respect to the rights not assigned, shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as the
owner of the copyright, and this Act has effect accordingly"). See also 17 U.S.C. §
201(d) (2006).
185 See Civil Code of Qu6bec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 art. 1010 (Can.) (defining divided co-
ownership as "where the right of ownership is apportioned among the co-owners in
fractions, each compromising a physically divided private portion and a share of the
common portions").
186 The assignments do not need to be registered. See Canada Copyright Act, supra
note 2, at § 13(4) (quoting that "no assignment or grant is valid unless it is in writing
signed by the owner of the right in respect of which the assignment or grant is made, or
by the owner's duly authorized agent."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2006).
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(qua duration, territory, type of exclusive right, and among an open-
ended group of individuals), only exclusive licenses create a separate
proprietary interest and are subject to formality requirements. 187 By
contrast, non-exclusive licenses confer contract rights.'88 On that basis,
copyright could exemplify the numerus clausus principle.
On the other hand, copyright may be an outlier to the numerus
clausus principle in other respects. Given the intangible nature of
copyright, courts may be more inclined to interpret the scope of
copyright and other intellectual property in a less predictable manner
than in relation to tangible property.' 89 Copyright can be assigned in
whole or in part in multiple ways, creating a potentially infinite list of
co-exiting lesser forms of proprietary interests. The creation of new
proprietary interests runs counter to the numerus clausus principle,
increasing search costs for future copyright assignees.190 Copyright,
unlike other forms of property including real estate, patents, and to
some extent trademarks, 191 does not necessarily need to be registered
in order for a copyright holder's work to be protected.'" Registration
plays an important notification function for third parties about the
existence and scope of property rights that are consistent with the
standardization of property. However, registration is neither a
constitutive element of all property interests nor is it necessary with
respect to all forms of property to assert title.
To the extent that copyright shares the attributes of property, the
concern is not so much whether copyright conforms to the numerus
clausus principle as it is justifying why copyright needs to comply as
much as possible with the numerus clausus principle as a norm of
governance for the judiciary and law- and policy-makers.193 To what
187 See supra Part III. A(ii) (discussing copyright holders' open-ended powers and
privileges to exploit their exclusive rights); see also Canada Copyright Act, supra note
2, at § 13(4-7); Robertson, supra note 152, at para. 56 (citing Ritchie v. Sawmill Creek
Golf & Country Club Ltd., [2004] 35 C.P.R. (4th) 163 (Can.)).
1s [d
189 See supra Part II (focusing on the discussion of Michelin, supra note 19).
190 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 161, at 27.
191 See Canada Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 (stating that inventions need to be
registered as patents to confer exclusionary powers to patent holders); Canada Trade-
Marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 (stating trademarks can be registered but unregistered
trademarks can also benefit from protection).
192 See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, supra note 2, at § 54 (stating registration of
copyright is optional). See also 17 U.S.C. § 205 (2006); Berne Convention, supra note
1, at art. 5(2) (providing that the enjoyment and exercise of rights with respect to
protected works shall not be subject to any formality requirements).
193 See Chapdelaine, supra note 55, at 133-38 (discussing the justifications for the
application of the numerus clausus principle); see also Harvard Law Review Note, A
Justification for Allowing Fragmentation in Copyight, 124 HARv. L. REV. 1751 (2011)
(discussing the necessity of maintaining fragmentation in copyright).
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extent are the concerns favoring the standardization of property in the
realm of tangible property similar in the field of intangible property,
e.g. copyright? In addition to asking whether copyright exemplifies the
numerus clausus principle, the application of the principle to copyright
holders' commercial practices that alter consumer property rights in
copies of copyright works is a different question of high interest that is
beyond the scope of this article.1 94
To sum up, two distinct proprietary interests emerge when looking
at copyright through the lens of property law and theory. The first
interest relates to copyright as a whole when considered as the object
capable of commercial exploitation. It contains all three elements that
are common on the ownership spectrum and confers trespassory
powers to copyright holders.195 The resource is not the copyright work
per se, but the bundle of exclusive rights as they relate to the work as
materialized.196 The requirement of prima facle open-ended powers
and privileges is fulfilled differently than with respect to tangible forms
of property.'9 While the list of exclusive rights is relatively closed and
defined, the exploitation or uses that copyright holders can make of
their copyright are endless. 198
The second interest focuses on the nature of copyright holders'
relationship with the physical embodiment of their works (e.g. the
commercial copies owned by consumers or other users). Copyright
holders' relationship with the embodiment of their works emerges as a
limited non-ownership proprietary interest. 199 Unlike copyright when
viewed as a whole, it lacks the open-ended powers and privileges that
are required to qualify as an ownership interest. 20 Finally, the
application of the numerus clausus principle to copyright as a norm of
judicial governance merits further investigation, in particular given the
intangible nature of copyright and the non-rivalrous nature of the
201resource that it protects.
IV. CONCLUSION
The characterization of copyright as a form of private property is
194 See Chapdelaine, supra note 55, at 197-99, 260-66 (discussing the numerus
clausus principle as it applies to copy ownership).
195 See discussion supra Part III. A.
196 See discussion supra Part III. A(i).
197 See discussion supra Part III. A(ii).
198 id
199 See discussion supra Part III. B.
200 id
201 See discussion supra Part III. C.
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controversial and politically charged. 202 The analysis of the property
attributes of copyright that I conducted here is revealing and provides
responses to some of the concerns raised in the debate about the nature
of copyright. First, copyright parlance and rhetoric about copyright
holders owning their works is far removed from the concept of property
and from how copyright is typically constructed by statute. By design,
copyright statutes do not institute such a relationship between
copyright holders and lawful copies of their works and likely never
will.2 03 Also, copyright holders' right in the embodiments of their works
(e.g. commercial copies made available to consumers) is a remote,
specific proprietary right that does not belong on the ownership
spectrum. Second, as a corollary to the first observation, there is reason
to be concerned about erroneous property language whereby copyright
holders own their works: it obliterates the framework of copyright as it
exists. To be sure, what is troublesome is not that copyright is a limited
form of property, but an erroneous and potentially dangerous
application of the concept of property to copyright.
No doubt the scope of copyright has been expanding in recent
years. A fallacious application of property concepts and its
consequences can be achieved perhaps more easily with intangible
property such as copyright, than with respect to tangible property,
given its abstract and ubiquitous nature. While the characterization of
copyright as property should not be the cause for its expansion, in turn,
the progressive expansion of copyright brings copyright closer to the
common understanding of property. 204 As I argued in this article,
negating the property nature of copyright altogether is problematic
legally and normatively and cannot counter the expansion of copyright.
Defining copyright as a sui generis right is no guarantee against the
expansion of copyright. At the same time, the application of property
law and theory to copyright, as the one that I presented here may reveal
the limited scope of copyright.
The increased threat to the legitimacy of copyright calls for more
coherence. Property provides a robust legal and theoretical framework
to address complex questions around competing rights and interests,
including consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works.
By nature and design, copyright statutes provide a very incomplete
enunciation of copyright holders' and other participants' rights and
obligations. While copyright statutes need to rely on underlying
institutions of property and contracts, the peculiar nature of copyright
202 See discussion supra Part III.
203 See discussion supra Part III. A.
204 See NETANEL, supra note 30, at 55.
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constantly puts its interaction with these institutions to the test. The
pursuit of understanding copyright through the lens of existing legal
institutions, such as property, and, to a certain extent contract, is a
pledge toward greater coherence in the law, which may offer a better
guarantee of the ability of copyright to evolve within broader spheres
of interest and to retain its legitimacy.
